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Chapter 16
Towards a Science of Security Games
Thanh Hong Nguyen, Debarun Kar, Matthew Brown, Arunesh Sinha,
Albert Xin Jiang, and Milind Tambe
Abstract Security is a critical concern around the world. In many domains from
counter-terrorism to sustainability, limited security resources prevent full security
coverage at all times; instead, these limited resources must be scheduled, while
simultaneously taking into account different target priorities, the responses of the
adversaries to the security posture and potential uncertainty over adversary types.
Computational game theory can help design such security schedules. Indeed,
casting the problem as a Bayesian Stackelberg game, we have developed new
algorithms that are now deployed over multiple years in multiple applications
for security scheduling. These applications are leading to real-world use-inspired
research in the emerging research area of “security games”; specifically, the research
challenges posed by these applications include scaling up security games to large-
scale problems, handling significant adversarial uncertainty, dealing with bounded
rationality of human adversaries, and other interdisciplinary challenges.
Keywords Security games • Bayesian Stackelberg games • Game theory •
Scalability • Uncertainty • Bounded rationality
16.1 Introduction
Security is a critical concern around the world that arises in protecting our ports,
airports, transportation and other critical national infrastructure from adversaries, in
protecting our wildlife and forests from poachers and smugglers, and in curtailing
the illegal flow of weapons, drugs, and money; and it arises in problems ranging
from physical to cyber-physical systems. In all of these problems, we have limited
security resources which prevent full security coverage at all times; instead, security
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resources must be deployed intelligently taking into account differences in priorities
of targets requiring security coverage, the responses of the attackers to the security
posture, and potential uncertainty over the types, capabilities, knowledge, and
priorities of attackers faced.
Game theory, which studies interactions among multiple self-interested agents,
is well-suited to the adversarial reasoning required for security resource allocation
and scheduling problems. Casting the problem as a Bayesian Stackelberg game,
we have developed new algorithms for efficiently solving such games that provide
randomized patrolling or inspection strategies. These algorithms have led to some
initial successes in this challenging problem arena, leading to advances over
previous approaches in security scheduling and allocation, e.g., by addressing
key weaknesses of predictability of human schedulers. These algorithms are now
deployed in multiple applications: ARMOR has been deployed at the Los Angeles
International Airport (LAX) since 2007 to randomize checkpoints on the roadways
entering the airport and canine patrol routes within the airport terminals [17];
IRIS, a game-theoretic scheduler for randomized deployment of the US Federal Air
Marshals Service (FAMS) requiring significant scale-up in underlying algorithms,
has been in use since 2009 [17]; PROTECT, which schedules the US Coast Guard’s
(USCG) randomized patrolling of ports using a new set of algorithms based on
modeling bounded-rational human attackers, has been deployed in the port of
Boston since April 2011 and is in use at the port of New York since February
2012 [39], and is headed for nationwide deployment; another application for
deploying escort boats to protect ferries has been deployed by the USCG since
April 2013 [10]; and TRUSTS [51] has been evaluated in field trials by the Los
Angeles Sheriffs Department (LASD) in the LA Metro system and a nationwide
deployment is now being evaluated at TSA. Most recently, PAWS—another game-
theoretic application using a Bayesian distribution of boundedly rational attackers
was tested by rangers in Uganda for protecting wildlife in Queen Elizabeth National
Park (QENP) in April 2014 [49]; MIDAS which is based on modeling behaviors
of attackers combined with the robust approach is in use by USCG for protecting
fisheries [14]. These initial successes point the way to major future applications in
a wide range of security domains; with major research challenges in scaling up our
game-theoretic algorithms, in addressing human adversaries’ bounded rationality
and uncertainties in action execution and observation, as well as in multiagent
learning.
Given many game-theoretic applications for solving real-world security prob-
lems, this book chapter will provide an overview of the models and algorithms,
key research challenges and a brief description of our successful deployments with
emphasis on three key lessons: (1) computational game theory-based decision aids
are in daily use by security agencies due to their capability for optimizing limited
security resources against strategic adversaries; (2) these applications provide fun-
damental research challenges, leading to an (emerging) science of security games,
including the challenge of massive scale games which cannot fit into memory and
the challenge of modeling many different forms of uncertainty in outcomes and
preferences, action execution, and human decision-making; and (3) current security
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game applications for solving green security games such as protecting wildlife and
the environment are challenging for AI; these are important global problems that
provide open research problems to integrate AI research (including planning and
learning) in security games.
16.2 Stackelberg Security Games
Stackelberg security games (SSGs) were first introduced to model leadership and
commitment [44], and are now used to study security problems ranging from
“police and robbers” scenario [12], computer network security [29], missile defense
systems [5], and terrorism [38]. Models for arms inspections and border patrolling
have also been modeled using inspection games [3], a related family of Stackelberg
games.
This section provides details on this use of Stackelberg games for modeling
security domains. We first give a generic description of security domains followed
by security games, the model by which security domains are formulated in the
Stackelberg game framework.
16.2.1 Security Domain Description
In a security domain, a defender must perpetually defend a set of targets using a
limited number of resources, whereas the attacker is able to surveil and learn the
defender’s strategy and attack after careful planning. This fits precisely into the
description of a Stackelberg game if we map the defender to the leader’s role and
the attacker to the follower’s role [3, 6]. An action, or pure strategy, for the defender
represents deploying a set of resources on patrols or checkpoints, e.g., scheduling
checkpoints at the LAX airport or assigning federal air marshals to protect flight
tours. The pure strategy for an attacker represents an attack at a target, e.g., a flight.
The strategy for the leader is a mixed strategy, a probability distribution over the
pure strategies of the defender. Additionally, with each target are also associated a
set of payoff values that define the utilities for both the defender and the attacker
in case of a successful or a failed attack. These payoffs are represented using the
security game model, described next.
16.2.2 Definition of SSGs
A key assumption of security games is that the payoff of an outcome depends
only on the target attacked, and whether or not it is covered by the defender [25].
The payoffs do not depend on the remaining aspects of the defender allocation.
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Table 16.1 Example of a
security game with two
targets
Defender Attacker
Target Covered Uncovered Covered Uncovered
t1 10 0 1 1
t2 0 10 1 1
For example, if an adversary succeeds in attacking target t1, the penalty for the
defender is the same whether the defender was guarding target t2 or not.
This allows us to compactly represent the payoffs of a security game. Specifi-
cally, a set of four payoffs is associated with each target. These four payoffs are the
rewards and penalties to both the defender and the attacker in case of a successful or
an unsuccessful attack, and are sufficient to define the utilities for both players for
all possible outcomes in the security domain. Table 16.1 shows an example security
game with two targets: t1 and t2. In this example game, if the defender was covering
(protecting) target t1 and the attacker attacked t1, the defender would get 10 units of
reward whereas the attacker would receive 1 units. We make the assumption that
in a security game it is always better for the defender to cover a target as compared
to leaving it uncovered, whereas it is always better for the attacker to attack an
uncovered target. This assumption is consistent with the payoff trends in the real-
world. A special case is zero-sum games, in which for each outcome the sum of
utilities for the defender and attacker is zero, although in general security games are
not necessarily zero-sum.
In the above example, all payoff values are exactly known. In practice, we often
have uncertainty over the payoffs and preferences of the players. Bayesian games
are a well-known game-theoretic model in which such uncertainty is modeled using
multiple types of players, with each associated with its own payoff values. For
security games of interest, the main source of payoff uncertainty is regarding the
attacker’s payoffs. In the resulting Bayesian Stackelberg game model, there is only
one leader type (e.g., only one police force), although there can be multiple follower
types (e.g., multiple attacker types trying to infiltrate security) [35]. Each follower
type is represented using a different payoff matrix. The leader does not know the
follower’s type, but knows the probability distribution over them. The goal is to find
the optimal mixed strategy for the leader to commit to, given that the defender could
be facing any of the follower types.
16.2.3 Solution Concept: Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium
The solution to a security game is a mixed strategy for the defender that maximizes
the expected utility of the defender, given that the attacker learns the mixed strategy
of the defender and chooses a best response for himself. This solution concept is
known as a Stackelberg equilibrium [27].
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The most commonly adopted version of this concept in related literature is called
strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) [4, 9, 35, 45]. An SSE for security games is
informally defined as follows (the formal definition of SSE is not introduced for
brevity, and can instead be found in [25]):
Definition 1. A pair of strategies form a SSE if they satisfy
1. The defender plays a best response, that is, the defender cannot get a higher
payoff by choosing any other strategy.
2. The attacker plays a best response, that is, given a defender strategy, the attacker
cannot get a higher payoff by attacking any other target.
3. The attacker breaks ties in favor of the leader.
The assumption that the follower will always break ties in favor of the leader
in cases of indifference is reasonable because in most cases the leader can induce
the favorable strong equilibrium by selecting a strategy arbitrarily close to the
equilibrium that causes the follower to strictly prefer the desired strategy [45].
Furthermore an SSE exists in all Stackelberg games, which makes it an attractive
solution concept compared to versions of Stackelberg equilibrium with other tie-
breaking rules. Finally, although initial applications relied on the SSE solution
concept, we have since proposed new solution concepts that are more robust against
various uncertainties in the model [1, 37, 50] and have used these robust solution
concepts in some of the later applications.
16.3 Deployed Real-World Security Applications
In this section, we describe several deployed and emerging applications of the
Stackelberg game framework in different real-world domains. Besides describing
successful transitions of research, our aim is to set the stage for later sections in
which we discuss the research challenges that arise.
16.3.1 ARMOR for Los Angeles International Airport
Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) is the largest destination airport in the
USA and serves 60–70 million passengers per year. The LAX police use diverse
measures to protect the airport, which include vehicular checkpoints, police units
patrolling the roads to the terminals, patrolling inside the terminals (with canines),
and security screening and bag checks for passengers. The application of our
game-theoretic approach is focused on two of these measures: (1) placing vehicle
checkpoints on inbound roads that service the LAX terminals, including both
location and timing, and (2) scheduling patrols for bomb-sniffing canine units at the
different LAX terminals. The eight different terminals at LAX have very different
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Fig. 16.1 LAX checkpoints are deployed using ARMOR
characteristics, like physical size, passenger loads, international versus domestic
flights, etc. These factors contribute to the differing risk assessments of these
eight terminals. Furthermore, the numbers of available vehicle checkpoints and
canine units are limited by resource constraints. Thus, it is challenging to optimally
allocate these resources to improve their effectiveness while avoiding patterns in the
scheduled deployments.
The ARMOR system (Assistant for Randomized Monitoring over Routes) focuses
on two of the security measures at LAX (checkpoints and canine patrols) and
optimizes security resource allocation using Bayesian Stackelberg games. Take the
vehicle checkpoints model as an example. Assuming that there are n roads, the
police’s strategy is placing m < n checkpoints on these roads where m is the
maximum number of checkpoints. ARMOR randomizes allocation of checkpoints
to roads. The adversary may conduct surveillance of this mixed strategy and may
potentially choose to attack through one of these roads. ARMOR models different
types of attackers with different payoff functions, representing different capabilities
and preferences for the attacker. ARMOR uses DOBSS (Decomposed Optimal
Bayesian Stackelberg Solver) [35] to compute the defender’s optimal strategy.
ARMOR has been successfully deployed since August 2007 at Fig. 16.1.
16.3.2 IRIS for US FAMS
The US FAMS allocates air marshals to flights originating in and departing from
the USA to dissuade potential aggressors and prevent an attack should one occur.
Flights are of different importance based on a variety of factors such as the numbers
of passengers, the population of source and destination, and international flights
from different countries. Security resource allocation in this domain is significantly
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more challenging than for ARMOR: a limited number of air marshals need to be
scheduled to cover thousands of commercial flights each day. Furthermore, these air
marshals must be scheduled on tours of flights that obey various constraints (e.g.,
the time required to board, fly, and disembark). Simply finding schedules for the
marshals that meet all of these constraints is a computational challenge. Our task
is made more difficult by the need to find a randomized policy that meets these
scheduling constraints, while also accounting for the different values of each flight.
Against this background, the IRIS system (Intelligent Randomization In Schedul-
ing) has been developed and deployed by FAMS since October 2009 to randomize
schedules of air marshals on international flights. In IRIS, the targets are the set of
n flights and the attacker could potentially choose to attack one of these flights. The
FAMS can assign m < n air marshals that may be assigned to protect these flights.
Since the number of possible schedules exponentially increases with the number
of flights and resources, DOBSS is no longer applicable to the FAMS domain.
Instead, IRIS uses the much faster ASPEN algorithm [16] to generate the schedule
for thousands of commercial flights per day.
16.3.3 PROTECT for USCG
The USCG’s mission includes maritime security of the US coasts, ports, and inland
waterways; a security domain that faces increased risks due to threats such as
terrorism and drug trafficking. Given a particular port and the variety of critical
infrastructure that an attacker may attack within the port, USCG conducts patrols to
protect this infrastructure; however, while the attacker has the opportunity to observe
patrol patterns, limited security resources imply that USCG patrols cannot be at
every location 24/7. To assist the USCG in allocating its patrolling resources, the
PROTECT (Port Resilience Operational/Tactical Enforcement to Combat Terrorism)
model has been designed to enhance maritime security. It has been in use at the port
of Boston since April 2011, and is also in use at the port of New York since February
2012 (Fig. 16.2). Similar to previous applications ARMOR and IRIS, PROTECT uses
an attacker–defender Stackelberg game framework, with USCG as the defender
against terrorists that conduct surveillance before potentially launching an attack.
The key idea in PROTECT is also that unpredictability creates situations of
uncertainty for an enemy and can be enough to deem a target less appealing. While
randomizing patrol patterns is key, PROTECT also addresses the fact that the targets
are of unequal value, understanding that the attacker will adapt to whatever patrol
patterns USCG conducts. The output of PROTECT is a schedule of patrols which
includes when the patrols are to begin, what critical infrastructure to visit for each
patrol, and what activities to perform at each critical infrastructure.
While PROTECT builds on previous work, it offers key innovations. First, this
system is a departure from the assumption of perfect attacker rationality noted in
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Fig. 16.2 USCG boats patrolling the ports of Boston and NY. (a) PROTECT is being used in
Boston. (b) Extending PROTECT to NY
previous work, relying instead on a quantal response model [31] of the attacker’s
behavior. Second, to improve PROTECT’s efficiency, a compact representation of the
defender’s strategies is used by exploiting equivalence and dominance. Finally, the
evaluation of PROTECT for the first time provides real-world data: (1) comparison
of human-generated vs PROTECT schedules, and (2) results from an Adversarial
Perspective Team’s (APT) (human mock attackers) analysis. The PROTECT model
has now been extended to other US ports like Los Angeles/Long Beach and is
moving towards nationwide deployment.
16.3.4 Ferry Protection for the USCG
Another problem that USCG faces is the protection of ferries, including the Staten
Island Ferry in New York, from potential terrorist attacks from water. We developed
a game-theoretic system for scheduling escort boat patrols to protect ferries, and
this has been deployed at the Staten Island Ferry since 2013 [10] (Fig. 16.3).
The key research challenge is the fact that the ferries are continuous moving in a
continuous domain, and the attacker could attack at any moment in time. This type
of moving targets domain leads to game-theoretic models with continuous strategy
spaces, which presents computational challenges. Our theoretical work showed that
while it is safe to discretize the defender’s strategy space, discretizing the attacker’s
strategy space would result in loss of utility. We developed a novel algorithm that
uses a compact representation for the defender’s mixed-strategy space while being
able to exactly model the attacker’s continuous strategy space. The implemented
algorithm, running on a laptop, is able to generate daily schedules for escort boats
with guaranteed expected utility values.
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Fig. 16.3 Escort boats protecting the Staten Island Ferry use strategies generated by our system
Fig. 16.4 TRUSTS for transit systems. (a) Los Angeles Metro. (b) Barrier-free entrance to transit
system
16.3.5 TRUSTS for Security in Transit Systems
Urban transit systems face multiple security challenges, including deterring fare
evasion, suppressing crime and counter-terrorism. In particular, in some urban
transit systems, including the Los Angeles Metro Rail system, passengers are legally
required to purchase tickets before entering but are not physically forced to do so
(Fig. 16.4). Instead, security personnel are dynamically deployed throughout the
transit system, randomly inspecting passenger tickets. This proof-of-payment fare
collection method is typically chosen as a more cost-effective alternative to direct
fare collection, i.e., when the revenue lost to fare evasion is believed to be less
than what it would cost to directly preclude it. In the case of Los Angeles Metro,
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with approximately 300,000 riders daily, this revenue loss can be significant; the
annual cost has been estimated at $5.6 million [13]. The Los Angeles Sheriffs
Department (LASD) deploys uniformed patrols on board trains and at stations
for fare-checking (and for other purposes such as crime prevention). The LASD’s
current approach relies on humans for scheduling the patrols, which places a
tremendous cognitive burden on the human schedulers who must take into account
all of the scheduling complexities (e.g., train timings, switching time between trains,
and schedule lengths).
The TRUSTS system (Tactical Randomization for Urban Security in Transit
Systems) models the patrolling problem as a leader–follower Stackelberg game [51].
The leader (LASD) pre-commits to a mixed-strategy patrol (a probability distribu-
tion over all pure strategies), and riders observe this mixed strategy before deciding
whether to buy the ticket or not. Both ticket sales and fines issued for fare evasion
translate into revenue for the government. Therefore the utility for the leader is the
total revenue (total ticket sales plus penalties). The main computational challenge
is the exponentially many possible patrol strategies, each subject to both the spatial
and temporal constraints of travel within the transit network under consideration.
To overcome this challenge, TRUSTS uses a compact representation of the strategy
space which captures the spatiotemporal structure of the domain.
The LASD conducted field tests of this TRUSTS system in the LA Metro in
2012, and one of the feedback comments from the officers was that patrols are
often interrupted due to execution uncertainty such as emergencies and arrests.
Utilizing techniques from planning under uncertainty [in particular Markov Deci-
sion Processes (MDPs)], we proposed a general approach to dynamic patrolling
games in uncertain environments, which provides patrol strategies with contingency
plans [20]. This led to schedules now being loaded onto smartphones and given
to officers. If interruptions occur, the schedules are then automatically updated on
the smartphone app. The LASD has conducted successful field evaluations using
the smartphone app, and the TSA is currently evaluating it towards nationwide
deployment.
Crime presents a serious problem in transit systems like LA Metro. Furthermore,
unlike terrorists that strategically plans an attack, criminals are often opportunistic,
in that their decisions are based on the available opportunities encountered. For
the crime problem, we developed a new game-theoretic model that utilizes recent
advances in criminology on modeling opportunistic criminals, and novel efficient
algorithms that achieve speed-ups by exploiting the spatiotemporal structure of the
domain [53].
16.3.6 Fishery Protection for USCG
Fisheries are a vital natural resource from both an ecological and economic
standpoint. However, fish stocks around the world are threatened with collapse due
to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. In the USA, the Coast Guard
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(USCG) is tasked with the responsibility of protecting and maintaining the nation’s
fisheries. To this end, the USCG deploys resources (both air and surface assets) to
conduct patrols over fishery areas in order to deter and mitigate IUU fishing. Due
to the large size of these patrol areas and the limited patrolling resources available,
it is impossible to protect an entire fishery from IUU fishing at all times. Thus, an
intelligent allocation of patrolling resources is critical for security agencies like the
USCG.
The MIDAS algorithm was developed to address the types challenges faced in
natural resource conservation domains such as fishery protection. In stark contrast
to counter-terrorism settings, there is frequent interaction between the defender
and attacker in these resource conservation domains. This distinction is important
for three reasons. First, due to the comparatively low stakes of the interactions,
rather than a handful of persons or groups, the defender must protect against
numerous adversaries (potentially hundreds or even more), each of which may
behave differently. Second, frequent interactions make it possible to collect data
on the actions of the adversaries actions over time. Third, the adversaries are
less strategic given the short planning windows between actions. Combining these
factors, MIDAS models a population of boundedly rational adversaries and utilizes
available data to learn the behavior models of the adversaries using the subjective
utility quantal response (SUQR) model in order to improve the way the defender
allocates its patrolling resources.
MIDAS has been successfully deployed and evaluated by the USCG in the Gulf of
Mexico. Historical data on fish stock densities, USCG air and surface patrols, as well
as IUU sightings and interdictions was used to construct the game model. Between
July and September 2014, six aircraft patrols were generated weekly to protect a
80 by 60 nautical mile area on the US–Mexico border off the coast of Texas. This
region represents a critical fishery for red snapper, a species that is highly lucrative
to fish, and as such observes a high volume of IUU fishing. This evaluation period
in the Gulf of Mexico represents the most sophisticated real-world deployment of
security games to date. MIDAS is currently under review by the USCG and is being
considered for further deployment in the Gulf of Mexico as well as in other fisheries
nationwide.
16.4 Emerging Real-World Security Applications
16.4.1 Networked Domains
Beyond the deployed applications above, there are a number of emerging application
areas. One such area of great importance is securing urban city networks, trans-
portation networks, computer networks, and other network centric security domains.
For example, after the terrorist attacks in Mumbai of 2008 [8], the Mumbai police
have started setting up vehicular checkpoints on roads. We can model the problem
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faced by the Mumbai police as a security game between the Mumbai police and an
attacker. In this urban security game, the pure strategies of the defender correspond
to allocations of resources to edges in the network—for example, an allocation of
police checkpoints to roads in the city. The pure strategies of the attacker correspond
to paths from any source node to any target node—for example, a path from a
landing spot on the coast to the airport. The strategy space of the defender grows
exponentially with the number of available resources, whereas the strategy space
of the attacker grows exponentially with the size of the network. In addressing this
computational challenge, novel algorithms based on incremental strategy generation
have been able to generate randomized defender strategies that scale up to the entire
road network of Mumbai [19].
The Stackelberg game framework can also be applied to adversarial domains that
exhibit “contagious” actions for each player. For example, word-of-mouth advertis-
ing/viral marketing has been widely studied by marketers trying to understand why
one product or video goes “viral” while others go unnoticed. Counter-insurgency is
the contest for the support of the local leaders in an armed conflict and can include a
variety of operations such as providing security and giving medical supplies. These
efforts carry a social effect beyond the action taken that can cause advantageous
ripples through the neighboring population. Moreover, multiple intelligent parties
attempt to leverage the same social network to spread their message, necessitating
an adversary-aware approach to strategy generation. Game-theoretic approaches can
be used to generate resource-allocations strategies for such large-scale, real-world
networks [41, 42]. This interaction can be modeled as a graph with one player
attempting to spread influence while another player attempts to stop the probabilistic
propagation of that influence by spreading their own influence. This “blocking”
problem models situations faced by governments/peacekeepers combatting the
spread of terrorist radicalism and armed conflict with daily/weekly/monthly visits
with local leaders to provide support and discuss grievances [15].
Game-theoretic methods are also appropriate for modeling resource allocation
in cyber-security such as packet selection and inspection for detecting potential
threats in large computer networks. The problem of attacks on computer systems and
corporate computer networks gets more pressing each year. A number of intrusion
detection and monitoring systems are being developed, e.g., deep packet inspection
method that periodically selects a subset of packets in a computer network for
analysis. The attacking/protecting problem can be formulated as a game between
two players: the attacker (or the intruder) and the defender (the detection system).
The actions of the attacker can be seen as sending malicious packets from a
controlled computer to vulnerable computers. The objective of the defender is to
prevent the intruder from succeeding by selecting the packets for inspection and
subsequently thwarting the attack. However, packet inspections cause unwanted
latency and hence the defender has to decide where and how to inspect network
traffic. The computational challenge is efficiently computing the optimal defending
strategies for such network scenarios [43].
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Fig. 16.5 Examples of illegal activities in green security domains. (a) An illegal trapping tool.
(b) Illegally cutting trees.
16.4.2 Green Security Domains
A number of our newer applications are focused on resource conservation through
suppression of environmental crime. One area is protecting forests [22], where
we must protect a continuous forest area from extractors by patrols through the
forest that seek to deter such extraction activity (Fig. 16.5). With limited resources
for performing such patrols, a patrol strategy will seek to distribute the patrols
throughout the forest, in space and time, in order to minimize the resulting amount
of extraction that occurs or maximize the degree of forest protection. This problem
can be formulated as a Stackelberg game and the focus is on computing optimal
allocations of patrol density [22].
Endangered species poaching is reaching critical levels as the populations of
these species plummet to unsustainable numbers. The global tiger population, for
example, has dropped over 95 % from the start of the 1900s and has resulted in
three out of nine species extinctions. Depending on the area and animals poached,
motivations for poaching range from profit to sustenance, with the former being
more common when profitable species such as tigers, elephants, and rhinos are
the targets. To counter poaching efforts and to rebuild the species’ populations,
countries have set up protected wildlife reserves and conservation agencies tasked
with defending these large reserves. Because of the size of the reserves and the
common lack of law enforcement resources, conservation agencies are at a signif-
icant disadvantage when it comes to deterring and capturing poachers. Agencies
use patrolling as a primary method of securing the park. Due to their limited
resources, however, patrol managers must carefully create patrols that account for
many different variables (e.g., limited patrol units to send out, multiple locations
that poachers can attack at varying distances to the outpost). Our proposed system
Protection Assistant for Wildlife Security (PAWS) aims to assist conservation
agencies in their critical role of patrol creation by predicting where poachers will
attack and optimizing patrol routes to cover those areas.
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16.5 Scale Up to Real-World Problem Sizes
The wide use of Stackelberg games has inspired theoretical and algorithmic progress
leading to the development of fielded applications, as described in Sect. 16.3. For
example, DOBSS [35], an algorithm for solving Bayesian Stackelberg games, is
central to the fielded application ARMOR in use at the Los Angeles International
Airport [17]. Conitzer and Sandholm [9] gave complexity results and algorithms
for computing optimal commitment strategies in Bayesian Stackelberg games,
including both pure- and mixed-strategy commitments.
These early works assumed that the set of pure strategies for the players are given
explicitly. Many real-world problems, like the FAMS and urban road networks,
present billions of pure strategies to both the defender and the attacker. Such large
problem instances cannot even be represented in modern computers, let alone solved
using previous techniques. We have proposed models and algorithms that compute
optimal defender strategies for massive real-world security domains [16, 18].
16.5.1 Scale Up with Defender Pure Strategies
In this section, we describe one particular algorithm ASPEN, that computes SSE
in domains with a very large number of pure strategies (up to billions of actions)
for the defender [16]. ASPEN builds on the insight that in many real-world game-
theoretic problems, there exist solutions with small support sizes, which are mixed
strategies in which only a small set of pure strategies are played with positive
probability [28]. ASPEN exploits this by using a strategy generation approach for
the defender, in which defender pure strategies are iteratively generated and added
to the optimization formulation.
As an example, let us consider the problem faced by the FAMS. There are
currently tens of thousands of commercial flights flying each day, and public
estimates state that there are thousands of air marshals that are scheduled daily
by the FAMS [24]. Air marshals must be scheduled on tours of flights that obey
logistical constraints (e.g., the time required to board, fly, and disembark). An
example of a schedule is an air marshal assigned to a round trip from Los Angeles
to New York and back.
ASPEN [16] casts this problem as a security game, where the attacker can choose
any of the flights to attack, and each air marshal can cover one schedule. Each
schedule here is a feasible set of targets that can be covered together; for the
FAMS, each schedule would represent a flight tour which satisfies all the logistical
constraints that an air marshal could fly. A joint schedule then would assign every
air marshal to a flight tour, and there could be exponentially many joint schedules
in the domain. A pure strategy for the defender in this security game is a joint
schedule. As mentioned previously, ASPEN employs strategy generation since all
the defender pure strategies cannot be enumerated for such a massive problem.
ASPEN decomposes the problem into a master problem and a slave problem, which
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Fig. 16.6 Strategy generation employed in ASPEN: the schedules for a defender are generated
iteratively. The slave problem is a novel minimum-cost integer flow formulation that computes the
new pure strategy to be added to P; J4 is computed and added in this example
are then solved iteratively. Given a number of pure strategies, the master solves for
the defender and the attacker optimization constraints, while the slave is used to
generate a new pure strategy for the defender in every iteration.
The iterative process is graphically depicted in Fig. 16.6. The master operates
on the pure strategies (joint schedules) generated thus far, which are represented
using the matrix P. Each column of P, Jj, is one pure strategy (or joint schedule).
An entry Pij in the matrix P is 1 if a target ti is covered by joint-schedule Jj, and 0
otherwise. The objective of the master problem is to compute x, the optimal mixed
strategy of the defender over the pure strategies in P. The objective of the slave
problem is to generate the best joint schedule to add to P. The best joint schedule
is identified using the concept of reduced costs, which measures if a pure strategy
can potentially increase the defender’s expected utility (the details of the approach
are provided in [16]). While a naïve approach would be to iterate over all possible
pure strategies to identify the pure strategy with the maximum potential, ASPEN
uses a novel minimum-cost integer flow problem to efficiently identify the best pure
strategy to add. ASPEN always converges on the optimal mixed strategy for the
defender.
Employing strategy generation for large optimization problems is not an “out-of-
the-box” approach, the problem has to be formulated in a way that allows for domain
properties to be exploited. The novel contribution of ASPEN is to provide a linear
formulation for the master and a minimum-cost integer flow formulation for the
slave, which enables the application of strategy generation techniques. Additionally,
ASPEN also provides a branch-and-bound heuristic to reason over attacker actions.
This branch-and-bound heuristic provides a further order of magnitude speed-up,
allowing ASPEN to handle the massive sizes of real-world problems.
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Fig. 16.7 Strategy
generation employed in
RUGGED: the pure strategies
for both the defender and the
attacker are generated
iteratively
16.5.2 Scale Up with Defender and Attacker Pure Strategies
In domains such as the urban network security setting described in Sect. 16.4, the
number of pure strategies of both the defender and the attacker are exponentially
large. In this section, we describe the RUGGED algorithm [18], which generates
pure strategies for both the defender and the attacker.
RUGGED models the domain as a zero-sum game, and computes the minimax
equilibrium, since the minimax strategy is equivalent to the SSE in zero-sum games.
Figure 16.7 shows the working of RUGGED: at each iteration, the minimax module
generates the optimal mixed strategies hx; ai for the two players for the current
payoff matrix, the Best Response Defender module generates a new strategy for the
defender that is a best response against the attacker’s current strategy a, and the
Best Response Attacker module generates a new strategy for the attacker that is a
best response against the defender’s current strategy x. The rows Xi in the figure
are the pure strategies for the defender, they would correspond to an allocation of
checkpoints in the urban road network domain. Similarly, the columns Aj are the
pure strategies for the attacker, they represent the attack paths in the urban road
network domain. The values in the matrix represent the payoffs to the defender. The
algorithm stops when neither of the generated best responses improve on the current
minimax strategies.
The contribution of RUGGED is to provide the mixed-integer formulations
for the best response modules which enable the application of such a strategy
generation approach. RUGGED can compute the optimal solution for deploying up
to 4 resources in real-city network with as many as 250 nodes within a reasonable
time frame of 10 h (the complexity of this problem can be estimated by observing
that both the best response problems are NP-hard themselves [18]). More recent
work [19] builds on RUGGED and proposes SNARES, which allows scale-up to the
entire city of Mumbai, with 10–15 checkpoints.
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16.5.3 Scale Up with Mobile Resources and Moving Targets
In this section, we describe the CASS (Solver for Continuous Attacker Strategy)
algorithm [10] for solving security problems where the defender has mobile
patrollers to protect a set of mobile targets against the attacker who can attack
these moving targets at any time during their movement. In these security problems,
the sets of pure strategies for both the defender and attacker are continuous w.r.t
the continuous spatial and time components of the problem domain. The CASS
algorithm attempts to compute the optimal mixed strategy for the defender without
discretizing the attacker’s continuous strategy set; it exactly models this set using
sub-interval analysis which exploits the piecewise-linear structure of the attacker’s
expected utility function. The insight of CASS is to compactly represent the
defender’s mixed strategies as a marginal probability distribution, overcoming the
short-coming of an exponential number of pure strategies for the defender.
As a domain example, in the problem of protecting ferries described in
Sect. 16.3.4, there are a number of ferries carrying hundreds of passengers in
many waterside cities. These ferries are attractive targets for an attacker who can
approach the ferries with a small boat packed with explosives at any time; this
attacker’s boat may only be detected when it comes close to the ferries. Small, fast,
and well-armed patrol boats can provide protection to such ferries by detecting
the attacker within a certain distance and stop him from attacking with the armed
weapons. However, the numbers of patrol boats are often limited, thus the defender
cannot protect the ferries at all times and locations.
CASS casts this problem as a zero-sum security game in which targets move
along a one-dimensional domain, i.e., a straight line segment connecting two
terminal points. This one-dimensional assumption is valid as in real-world domains
such as ferry protection, ferries normally move back-and-forth in a straight line
between two terminals (i.e., ports) around the world. Although the targets’ locations
vary w.r.t time changes, these targets have a fixed daily schedule, meaning that
determining the locations of the targets at a certain time is straightforward. The
defender has mobile patrollers (i.e., boats) that can move along between two
terminals to protect the targets. While the defender is trying to protect the targets,
the attacker will decide to attack a certain target at a certain time. The probability
that the attacker successfully attacks depends on the positions of the patroller at that
time. Specifically, each patroller possesses a protective circle of radius within which
she can detect and try to intercept any attack, whereas she is incapable of detecting
the attacker prior to that radius.
In CASS, the defender’s strategy space is discretized and her mixed strategy is
compactly represented using flow distributions. Figure 16.8 shows an example of a
ferry transition graph in which each node of the graph indicates a particular pair of
(location and time step) for the target. Here, there are three location points, namely
A, B, and C on a straight line where B lies between A and C. Initially, the target
is at one of these location points at the 5-min time step. Then the target moves to
the next location point which is determined based on the connectivity between these
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Fig. 16.8 An example of a ferry transition graph
points at the 10-min time step, and so on. For example, if the target is at the location
point A at the 5-min time step, denoted by (A, 5 min) in the transition graph, it can
move to the location point B or stay at location point A at the 10-min time step.
The defender follows this transition graph to protect the target. A pure strategy for
the defender is defined as a trajectory of this graph, e.g., the trajectory including
(A, 5 min), (B, 10 min), and (C, 15 min) indicates a pure strategy for the defender.
One key challenge of this representation for the defender’s pure strategies is that
the transition graph consists of an exponential number of trajectories, i.e., O.NT/
where N is the number of location points and T is the number of time steps. To
address this challenge, CASS proposes a compact representation of the defender’s
mixed strategy. Instead of directly computing a probability distribution over pure
strategies for the defender, CASS attempts to compute the marginal probability that
the defender will follow a certain edge of the transition graph, e.g., the probability of
being at the node (A, 5 min) and moving to the node (B, 10 min). CASS shows that
any strategy in full representation can be mapped into a compact representation
as well as compact representation does not lead to any loss in solution quality.
This compact representation allows CASS to reformulate the resource-allocation
problem as computing the optimal marginal coverage of the defender over a number
of O.NT/ the edges of the transition graph.
16.5.4 Scale Up with Continuous Domains and Boundedly
Rational Attacker
As discussed in Sect. 16.3, natural resource conservation domains such as fishery
protection introduce a unique set of challenges which must be addressed, namely
scalability and robustness. For scalability, the defender is responsible for protecting
a large patrol area and therefore must consider a large strategy space. Even if the
patrol area is discretized into a grid or graph structure, the defender must still
reason over an exponential number of patrol strategies. For robustness, the defender
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Fig. 16.9 Overview of the
multiple iterative process
within the MIDAS algorithm
must protect against multiple boundedly rational adversaries. Bounded rationality
models, such as the quantal response (QR) model [31] and the SUQR model [32],
introduce stochastic actions, relaxing the strong assumption in classical game theory
that all players are perfectly rational and utility maximizing. These models are able
to better predict the actions of human adversaries and thus lead the defender to
choose strategies that perform better in practice. However, both QR and SUQR are
non-linear models resulting in a computationally difficult optimization problem for
the defender.
Previous work on boundedly rational adversaries has considered the challenges
of scalability and robustness separately, in [47, 48] and [14, 49], respectively. The
MIDAS algorithm was introduced to merge these two research threads for the first
time by addressing scalability and robustness simultaneously. Figure 16.9 provides
a visual overview of how MIDAS operates as an iterative process. Given the sheer
complexity of the game being solved, the problem is decomposed using a master–
slave formulation. The master utilizes multiple simplifications to create a relaxed
version of the original problem which is more efficient to solve. First, a piecewise-
linear approximation of the security game is taken to make the optimization problem
both linear and convex. This is a modified version of the approach in [47], replacing
the QR model of the adversary with SUQR and considering a robust maximin
formulation over a set of boundedly rational adversaries. Second, the complex
spatiotemporal constraints associated with patrols are initially ignored and then
incrementally added back using cut generation.
Due to the relaxations, solving the master produces a marginal strategy x which
is a probability distribution over targets. However, the defender ultimately needs a
probability distribution over patrols. Additionally, since not all of the spatiotemporal
constraints are considered in the master, the relaxed solution x may not be a feasible
solution to the original problem. Therefore, the slave checks if the marginal strategy
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x can expressed as a linear combination, i.e., probability distribution, of patrols by
computing a one-norm minimization. If the one-norm distance is zero, the marginal
distribution can be translated to a feasible pure strategy distribution which is in fact
the optimal solution to the original problem. Otherwise, the marginal distribution
is infeasible for the original problem. However, given the exponential number of
patrol strategies, even performing this optimality check is intractable. Thus, column
generation is used within the slave where only a small set of patrols is considered
initially in the optimality check and the set is expanded over time. Much like
previous examples of column generation in security games, e.g., [16], new patrols
are added by solving a minimum-cost network flow problem using reduced cost
information from the optimality check. If the optimality check fails, then the slave
generates a cut which is returned to refine and constrain the master, incrementally
bringing it closer to the original problem. The entire process is repeated until an
optimal solution is found.
16.6 Address Uncertainty in Real-World Problems
Addressing uncertainty is a key challenge of solving real-world security problems.
Traditional SSGs often assume that the defender has perfect information about the
game payoff matrix as well as the attacker’s behaviors. Moreover, she is supposed
to be capable of exactly executing her patrolling strategy. However, due to limited
data, the defender cannot precisely estimate such aspects, i.e., the payoff matrix
or attacker’s behaviors. Also, there is no guarantee that the defender can exactly
follow the patrolling schedule as a result of unseen events that could change her
patrolling strategy. These types of uncertainty could deteriorate the effectiveness
of the defender’s strategy and thus it is important for the defender to address them
when generating strategy. This section of the book chapter describes several game-
theoretic solutions to deal with uncertainty in SSGs.
16.6.1 Security Patrolling with Dynamic
Execution Uncertainty
In security problems such as fare inspections in the Los Angeles Metro Rail system
as described in Sect. 16.3.5, the targets, e.g., trains normally follow predetermined
schedules, thus timing is an important aspect which determines the effectiveness of
the defender’s patrolling schedules (the defender needs to be at the right location
at a specific time in order to protect these moving targets). However, as a result
of execution uncertainty (e.g., emergencies or errors), the defender could not carry
out her planned patrolling schedule in later time steps. For example, in real-world
trials for TRUSTS carried out by Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD), there
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is interruption (due to writing citations, felony arrests, and handling emergencies)
in a significant fraction of the executions, causing the officers to miss the train they
are supposed to catch as following the pre-generated patrolling schedule.
In this section, we present the Bayesian Stackelberg game model for security
patrolling with dynamic execution uncertainty introduced by Jiang et al. [20] in
which the uncertainty is represented using MDPs. The key advantage of this game-
theoretic model is that patrol schedules which are computed based on Stackelberg
equilibrium have contingency plans to deal with interruptions and are robust against
execution uncertainty. Specifically, the security problem with execution uncertainty
is represented as a two-player Bayesian Stackelberg game between the defender
and the attacker. The defender has multiple patrol units while there are also multiple
types of attackers which are unknown to the defender. A (naive) patrol schedule
consists of a set of sequenced commands in the following form: at time t, the patrol
unit should be at location l, and execute patrol action a. This patrol action a will
take the unit to the next location and time if successfully executed. However, due to
execution uncertainty, the patrol unit may end up at a different location and time.
Figure 16.10 shows an example of execution uncertainty in a transition graph where
if the patrol unit is currently at location A at the 5-min time step, she is supposed to
take the on-train action to move to location B in the next time step. However, unlike
CASS for ferry protection in which the defender’s action is deterministic, there is
a 10 % chance that she will still stay at location A due to execution uncertainty.
These interactions of the defender with the environment when executing patrol can
be represented as an MDP.
A key challenge of computing the SSE for this type of security problem is that
the dimension of the space of mixed strategies for the defender is exponential in
the number of states in terms of the defender’s times and locations. Nevertheless, in
many domains, the utilities have additional separable structure that the defender
can exploit to efficiently compute an SSE of patrolling games with execution
uncertainty. Specifically, when there exist unit utilities such as that both players’
utilities can be represented as a linear combination of these unit utilities, the
defender’s Markov strategy can be obtained based on the marginal probabilities of
Fig. 16.10 An example of execution uncertainty in a transition graph
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Fig. 16.11 Uncertainty space and algorithms
each patrolling unit reaching a state s D .t; l/, and taking action a. Here, the unit
utilities only depend on a certain patrolling unit’s state and action and a certain type
of attacker. Therefore, instead of directly computing the mixed strategy, the defender
attempts to compute the marginal probabilities which have dimensions polynomial
in the sizes of the MDPs (the details of this approach are provided in [20]).
16.6.2 Security Patrolling with Unified Uncertainty Space
In this section, we present the two leading approaches for addressing uncertainty in
security games in which the timing is not taken into account (which is different from
the MDP-based approach described in the previous section). We first summarize the
major types of uncertainties in security games as a three-dimensional uncertainty
space with the following three dimensions (Fig. 16.11): (1) uncertainty in the
adversary’s payoff; (2) uncertainty related to the defender’s strategy (includ-
ing uncertainty in the defender’s execution and the attacker’s observation); and
(3) uncertainty in the adversary’s rationality. These dimensions refer to three key
attributes which affect both players’ utilities. The origin of the uncertainty space
corresponds to the case with no uncertainty. Figure 16.11 also shows existing algo-
rithms for addressing uncertainty in SSGs which follow the two main approaches:
(1) modeling uncertainties based on Bayesian Stackelberg game models and (2)
applying robust-optimization techniques. For example, BRASS [36] is a robust
algorithm that only addresses attacker-payoff uncertainty while URAC (Unified
Robust Algorithmic framework for addressing unCertainties) [33] is a unified robust
algorithm that handles all types of uncertainty. In addition, HUNTER (Handling
UNcerTainty Efficiently using Relaxation) [52] is a Bayesian-based algorithm that
addresses all types of uncertainty except for the attacker-rationality uncertainty.
While the Bayesian-based approach assumes a known distribution of uncertainties
beforehand, the robust approach does not assume such prior knowledge.
16 Towards a Science of Security Games 369
Fig. 16.12 Branch-and-bound depth first search
In the following, we will describe the two algorithms which are representatives
of these two approaches: HUNTER (based on the Bayesian-based approach) and
URAC (based on the robust approach).
16.6.2.1 Bayesian Approach
Overall, HUNTER is a novel algorithm for solving Bayesian Stackelberg games
that can be used together with sample average approximation technique to solve
Stackelberg games with uncertainty in the defender’s execution and the attacker’s
observation [52]. Specifically, HUNTER attempts to compute the optimal mixed
strategy for the defender against multiple attacker types with a prior distribution
over the types. By exploiting the fact that the attacker is a perfectly rational player
who will attack the optimal target with highest utility, HUNTER applies a best-first
search for efficiently pruning the search tree that results from assigning attacker
types to pure strategies as shown in Fig. 16.12. In other words, HUNTER first
constructs the search tree by iteratively searching through all attacker types and
all corresponding pure strategies for that attacker type. At each leaf node, the linear
program at that node provides an optimal strategy for the defender such that the
attacker’s best response for every attacker type is the chosen target at that leaf node.
Moreover, at internal nodes of the search tree (which corresponds to a partial
assignment in which responses of a subset of attacker types are fixed), upper bounds
and lower bounds of the optimal SSG solution are computed, which are then used to
prune the search tree. As the size of the search tree is exponential in the number of
targets and number of attacker types, finding tight upper bounds and lower bounds
at internal nodes are essential in order to efficiently prune the search tree.
The key idea of HUNTER is to provide a tractable linear relaxation of Bayesian
Stackelberg games that provides an upper bound efficiently at each of HUNTER’s
internal nodes based on finding a convex hull of all feasible solutions of the
corresponding linear program at internal nodes. Figure 16.13 illustrates an example
of constructing a convex hull of feasible solution regions of a two-target Bayesian
security game with two attacker types. In Fig. 16.13a, each square corresponds to a
partial assignment of an attacker type to a pure strategy, i.e., attacked target. The set
370 T.H. Nguyen et al.
Fig. 16.13 An example of constructing a convex hull of feasible solution regions of a two-target
Bayesian security games with two attacker types. HUNTER
of feasible solutions for the defender is the union of four disjoint green regions. As
the optimal solution of a linear program is an extreme point of its feasible region,
the linear program w.r.t the green regions is equivalent to a linear program with
the same objective but w.r.t the convex hull of these four regions. However, the
number of the disjoint regions is exponential in the number of targets and number of
attacker types, finding a convex hull for these regions is computational. Therefore,
HUNTER derives the relaxation of a Bayesian Stackelberg game by considering
simpler convex hulls (of a small number of disjoint sets) (the blue and yellow regions
shown in Fig. 16.13b) of which intersection is a super set of the convex hull of green
regions. By solving this relaxation problem, HUNTER obtains an upper bound for
the optimal solution of the Bayesian security game.
16.6.2.2 Robust Approach
In this section, we present the robust URAC algorithm for addressing a combination
of all uncertainty types [33]. Consider an SSG where there is uncertainty in the
attacker’s payoff, the defender’s strategy (including the defender’s execution and
the attacker’s observation), and the attacker’s behavior, URAC represents all these
uncertainty types (except for the attacker’s behaviors) using uncertainty interval.
Instead of knowing exactly values of these game attributes, the defender only has
prior information w.r.t the upper bounds and lower bounds of these attributes. For
example, the attacker’s reward if successfully attacking a target t is known to lie
within the interval Œ1; 3. Furthermore, URAC assumes the attacker monotonically
responds to the defender’s strategy. In other words, the higher the expected utility of
a target, the more likely that the attacker will attack that target; however, the precise
attacking probability is unknown for the defender. This monotonicity assumption is
motivated by the Quantal Response model—a well-known human behavioral model
for capturing the attacker’s decision making [31].
Based on these uncertainty assumptions, URAC attempts to compute the optimal
strategy for the defender by maximizing her utility against the worst-case scenario
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of uncertainty. The key challenge of this optimization problem is that it involves
several types of uncertainty, resulting in multiple minimization steps for determining
the worst-case scenario. Nevertheless, URAC introduces a unified representation of
all these uncertainty types as a uncertainty set of attacker’s responses. Intuitively,
despite of any type of uncertainty mentioned above, what finally affects the
defender’s utility is the attacker’s response, which is unknown to the defender due
to uncertainty. As a result, URAC can represent the robust-optimization problem as
a single maximin problem.
However, the infinite uncertainty set of the attacker’s responses depends on the
planned mixed strategy for the defender, making this maximin problem difficult to
solve if directly applying the traditional method (i.e., taking the dual maximization
of the inner minimization of maximin and merging it with the outer maximization—
maximin now can be represented a single maximization problem). Therefore, URAC
proposes a divide-and-conquer method in which the defender’s strategy set is
divided into subsets such that the uncertainty set of the attacker’s responses is the
same for every defender strategy within each subset. This division leads to multiple
sub-maximin problems which can be solved by using the traditional method. The
optimal solution of the original maximin problem is now can be computed as a
maximum over all the sub-maximin problems.
16.7 Current Research
In this section we highlight several areas that we are actively doing research on, and
point out some of the open research challenges.
16.7.1 Scalability
Driven by the growing complexity of applications, a sequence of algorithms for
solving security games have been developed including DOBSS [35], ERASER [25],
ASPEN [16], and RUGGED [18]. However, existing algorithms still cannot scale up
to very large-scale domains. While RUGGED/SNARES computes optimal solutions
much faster than any of the previous approaches, much work remains to be done for
it to be applicable to complex heterogenous settings on large networks.
Besides strategy generation, another approach for dealing with an exponential
number of pure strategies is to compactly represent mixed strategies as marginal
probabilities of coverage on each of the targets. Because of the utility structure of
security games, such marginal probabilities are sufficient to express the expected
utility of the defender. Kiekintveld et al. [25] used this approach in ERASER
to formulate the problem of computing SSE as a compact mixed-integer linear
program. However, this approach is unable to deal with complex constraints on
the defender resources [26]. Nevertheless, we have recently been able to use this
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approach for certain patrolling domains, including fare-enforcement patrols in urban
transit systems [51] and boat patrols for protecting ferries [10]. In these domains a
pure strategy is a patrol of a certain time duration over a set of locations, and the
number of such pure strategies grow exponentially in the time duration. We were
able to compactly represent mixed strategies as fractional flows on the transition
graph, in which vertices are time–location pairs and arcs represent possible actions.
This allowed us to formulate the optimization problems compactly which led to
improved scalability. An open problem is to find other types of security domains
in which the strategy space can be compactly represented. Another is to develop a
hybrid approach that combines marginals and strategy generation.
16.7.2 Robustness
Classical game theory solution concepts often make assumptions on the knowledge,
rationality, and capability (e.g., perfect recall) of players. Unfortunately, these
assumptions could be wrong in real-world scenarios. Algorithms for the defender’s
optimal strategy have been proposed to take into account various uncertainties
faced in the domain, including payoff noise [52], execution/observation error [50],
and uncertain capability [1]. However, previous works assumed that the attacker
knows (or with a small noise) the defender’s mixed strategy. Recently An et al. [2]
proposed a formal framework to model the attacker’s belief update process as he
observes instantiations of the defender’s mixed strategy. The resulting optimization
problem for the defender is non-linear and scalable computation remains an
open issue. Furthermore, maximin is one of the leading robust method which is
widely applied for addressing uncertainty in security games, which is known to be
overly conservative. Minimax regret—an alternative less conservative robust criteria
has just been applied recently to address payoff uncertainty [34]. The resulting
optimization problem for using minimax regret is non-linear non-convex in both
the defender strategy and the attacker’s payoff and is thus computationally difficult.
Moreover, addressing a combination of uncertainty using minimax regret has not
been solved.
16.7.3 Adversary Modeling
One required research direction is addressing bounded rationality of human ad-
versaries. This is a fundamental problem that can affect the performance of our
game-theoretic solutions, since algorithms based on the assumption of the perfectly
rational adversary are not robust to deal with deviations of the adversary from
the optimal response. Recently, there has been some research on applying ideas
from behavioral game theory (e.g., prospect theory [23] and quantal response [30])
within security game algorithms. One line of approaches is based on the quantal
response model to predict the behaviors of the human adversary, and then to
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Fig. 16.14 Interface of the Guards and Treasures game to simulate the LAX security scenario
compute optimal defender strategies against such behavior of the adversary. These
include BRQR [46] which follows the logit quantal response (QR) [30] model,
and subsequent work on SUQR models [32]. The parameters of these models are
estimated by experimental tuning. Figure 16.14 shows the interface of an interactive
game used in our human subject experiments, based on the security scenario at the
LAX airport. The source code is available here. 1 Given the details for each target,
the participants playing this game were asked to choose a target to attack. Data from
a large set of participants on the Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) were collected
and used to learn the parameters of the behavioral models to predict future attacks.
Experiments with the Guards and Treasures game were conducted only as a
single-shot game where the adversary would observe the defender’s strategy and
then choose a target to attack and then the game would be over. While this may be
true for domains like counter-terrorism, in other real-world domains like fisheries
protection, or wildlife crime, there are repeated interactions between the defender
and the adversary, where the game progresses in “rounds.” We call this a Repeated
SSG (RSSG) where in each round the defender would play a particular strategy
and the adversary would observe that strategy and act accordingly. In order to
simulate this scenario and conduct experiments to identify adversary behavior in
such repeated settings, an online RSSG game was developed (shown in Fig. 16.15)
and deployed.
1http://teamcore.usc.edu/projects/BGT/experiment.html.
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Fig. 16.15 Interface of the Wildlife Poaching game to simulate an RSSG
In our game, human subjects play the role of poachers looking to place a snare
to hunt a hippopotamus in a protected wildlife park. The portion of the park shown
in the map is actually a Google Maps view of a portion of the QENP in Uganda.
The region shown is divided into a 5  5 grid, i.e., 25 distinct cells. Overlaid on the
Google Maps view of the park is a heat-map, which represents the rangers’ mixed
strategy x—a cell i with higher coverage probability xi is shown more in red, while
a cell with lower coverage probability is shown more in green. As the subjects play
the game and click on a particular region on the map, they were given detailed
information about the poacher’s reward, penalty, and coverage probability at that
region. However, the participants are unaware of the exact location of the rangers
while playing the game, i.e., they do not know the pure strategy that will be played
by the rangers, which is drawn randomly from mixed strategy x shown on the game
interface. In our game, there were nine rangers protecting this park, with each ranger
protecting one grid cell. Therefore, at any point in time, only 9 out of the 25 distinct
regions in the park are protected. A player succeeds if he places a snare in a region
which is not protected by a ranger, else he is unsuccessful. Similar to the Guards and
Treasures game, here also we recruited human subjects on AMT and asked them to
play this game repeatedly for a set of rounds with the defender strategy changing per
round based on the behavioral model being used to learn the adversary’s behavior.
While behavioral models like (QR) [30] and SUQR [32] assume that there is a
homogeneous population of adversaries, in the real-world we face heterogeneous
populations of adversaries. Therefore Bayesian SUQR was proposed to learn the
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behavioral model for each attack [49]. PAWS is an application which was originally
created using Bayesian SUQR. However, in real-world security domains, we may
have very limited data, or may only have some limited information on the biases
displayed by adversaries. An alternative approach is based on robust optimization:
instead of assuming a particular model of human decision making, try to achieve
good defender expected utility against a range of possible models. One instance of
this approach is MATCH [37], which guarantees a bound for the loss of the defender
to be within a constant factor of the adversary loss if the adversary responds non-
optimally. Another robust solution concept is monotonic maximin [21], which tries
to optimize defender utility against the worst-case monotonic adversary behavior,
where monotonicity is the property that actions with higher expected utility is played
with higher probability. Recently, there has been attempts to combine such robust-
optimization approaches with available behavior data [14] for RSSGs. However, an
open question of research is how these proposed models and algorithms will fare
against human subjects in RSSGs. Furthermore, since real-world human attackers
are sometimes distributed coalitions of socially, culturally, and cognitively biased
agents, we may need significant interdisciplinary research to build in social, cultural,
and coalitional biases into our adversary models.
16.7.4 Multi-Objective Optimization
In existing applications such as ARMOR, IRIS, and PROTECT, the defender is trying
to maximize a single objective. However, there are domains where the defender
has to consider multiple objectives simultaneously. Multi-objective security games
(MOSGs) have been proposed to address the challenges of domains with multiple
incomparable objectives [7]. In an MOSG, the threats posed by the attacker types are
treated as different objective functions which are not aggregated, thus eliminating
the need for a probability distribution over attacker types. Unlike Bayesian security
games which have a single optimal solution, MOSGs have a set of Pareto-optimal
(non-dominated) solutions which is referred to as the Pareto frontier. By presenting
the Pareto frontier to the end-user, they may be able to better understand the structure
of their problem as well as the trade-offs between different security strategies.
16.7.5 Evaluations: Lab Evaluation via Simulation
and Field Evaluation
Evaluation in itself is a major challenge given the real-world deployment of these
systems. It is difficult to define a baseline for the purpose of evaluation in security
applications, as safety often trumps costs. Our evaluation focuses on presenting the
benefit of our approach over prior approaches to security. We have conducted a
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Fig. 16.16 Field evaluation
Fig. 16.17 ARMOR evaluation results
number of such evaluations: simulations, human subjects in the lab, assessment
by domain experts internal and external to agencies deploying these applications,
data from deployments (such as number of citations to fare-evaders), and adversary
perspective teams (mock attacker teams) before and after deployment have all been
used. We have already discussed simulations and human subject experiments in
other parts of this chapter. Moreover, there are other evaluation approaches that we
have tried, which are summarized in Fig. 16.16. In the following, we will discuss
two of these approaches.
1. Data from deployment: data from the field, before and after deployment,
supports our claim about improved security with our game-theoretic approach.
Figure 16.17 shows the number of detected violations after ARMOR was
deployed at LAX airport. As can be seen, the number of detected violations
increased after our deployment and decreased in later years, suggesting better
detection and deterrence effect of our approach. The patrol schedule for Boston
port before and after our deployment of PROTECT (Fig. 16.18) clearly shows
that there was a definite pattern in the patrols before PROTECT. In particular,
there was low patrol for all targets on day 2, which could have been exploited
by an attacker. In contrast, PROTECT provides almost the same level of patrol
every day, with higher value targets patrol more often.
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Fig. 16.18 PROTECT evaluation results: pre deployment (left) and post deployment patrols
(right)
2. Mock attacker team: The USCG created an APT, a mock attacker team, to better
understand the adversaries view of targets in the Boston port. This team, in
addition to understanding the adversary’s viewpoint, also gauged the effective-
ness of patrol activities before and after deployment of PROTECT. The APT
incorporates the adversary’s known intent, capabilities, skills, commitment,
resources, and cultural influences. In addition, it helps in identifying the level
of deterrence projected at and perceived by the adversary. This analysis led to
the conclusion that the effectiveness of deterrence increased from the before to
after PROTECT deployment.
More detailed evaluations are discussed in the publications on the applica-
tions [11, 17, 39, 51], and more of these are discussed in [40].
16.8 Conclusion
Security is recognized as a world-wide challenge and game theory is an increasingly
important paradigm for reasoning about complex security resource allocation.
While the deployed game-theoretic applications have provided a promising start,
very significant amount of research remains to be done. These are large-scale
interdisciplinary research challenges that call upon multiagent researchers to work
with researchers in other disciplines, be “on the ground” with domain experts, and
examine real-world constraints and challenges that cannot be abstracted away.
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